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Executive Summary 
The National Property Fund represents a case of how to accomplish privatisation 
without derailment by scandals or other substantial problems. The Slovak case 
traces the evolution and environment of the National Property Fund (NPF), 
which was, and still is, the key element of the privatisation process in Slovakia. 
The NPF is a legal entity, intended to last until privatisation is over in the short 
term, whose main role is to implement approved privatisation projects, conclude 
sales and purchase contracts in line with such projects, organise public tenders 
and auctions, and temporarily administer government stakes (in formal terms, 
those were NPF stakes) in corporatised or partially privatised business 
companies. 
 
The Slovak NPF is an example of how to balance interest group politics with 
professional management to the degree that a state privatisation agency can 
successfully complete its mission of privatizing all entrusted state assets, before 
closing down.  The key is both the selection of highly qualified professional 
managers and especially the carefully defined inclusion in the political decision-
making process of a wide array of competing interest groups.   
 
In the Slovak experience, the political inclusion of wider interest group input 
improved the state’s chances of preventing monopolization of, and minimizing 
rent-seeking within, the privatisation process by one or a few interest groups.  
With wider interest group support and excellent professional management as 
jointly necessary conditions, state privatisation agencies are able to survive to 
complete their institutional mission with strong results. 
 
It is vital to adjust the privatization process already underway to subsequent 
legislation. The laws and regulations that were most wanting when reform and 
privatisation were launched included those on the procurement of investments, 
goods, and services (making it obligatory for state-owned enterprises and 
institutions to make procurements using tender procedures), regulations to 
prevent the conflict of interests, taxation regulations, and laws and regulations 
to prevent money laundering.  
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Corrupt behaviour may often be encountered in cases of defaulting on contracts 
concluded by buyers and the NPF. Most commonly, this concerns the failure to 
pay the purchase price of privatised property. The highest incidence of such 
behaviour is observed in instalment schemes.  
Instalment plans are always associated with the risks of post-privatisation 
corruption. The problem is that the new owners acquire property and the ability 
to dispose of it before paying the full price. In some cases, real estate may be 
used as collateral pending the last payment; however, it is not possible to 
prevent, in the case of defaults or contract termination, some assets being 
stripped away from the enterprise to the buyer and to the detriment of the 
enterprise, i.e. of the state or the NPF.   
Corruption cannot be avoided in the privatisation process. However, the degree 
of corruption is primarily determined by privatisation forms and methods that 
are employed, the pace of privatisation, and respect for the principle of equal 
opportunities.  
Where privatization is concerned, an important danger of the post-communist 
interest lobby system is the very important influence of newly created interest 
groups on management boards that influence the real political and economic 
decision-making process in Slovakia. 
The Fund is under direct control of the National Council of the Slovak Republic 
(i.e., the national parliament), to which the Fund submits its budgets, proposals 
of use of its property, and activity reports. Also, the top decision-making bodies 
of the Fund as an organization, i.e., its Presidium and Supervisory Board, are 
elected and recalled by the National Council of the Slovak Republic. 
The organizational structure of the Fund and its activities are governed by 
Statutes approved, after discussion with the Government, by Parliament. The 
Statutes also define the scope of mutual co-operation between the Fund, the 
Ministry of Finance, the founders and the Government, as related to the 
activities of the Fund, especially concerning the founding of companies under 
Privatization Awards, among other activities. 
The Executive Board of the NPF is where professional management capabilities 
interface with a small group of political representatives. This match is crucial for 
smooth operations of the NPF. It is also why an independent, professional 
management team is hired to help to mitigate potential influences which might 
lead to costly or damaging compromises affecting Board members’ 
professionalism.  The highly sensitive difficulty is to devise methods to constrain 
the rent-seeking or micro-managing influence of politicians, while allowing the 
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latter to exercise some measure of political oversight of transactions involving 
state assets. To ensure that this function is working properly, independent 
professionals have to be invited to run the day-to-day operations of the 
privatisation entity.  
With the privatisation mission of the NPF deemed to be largely accomplished, 
the government of the Slovak Republic recently decided (November 2005) that 
the NPF’s activities will be terminated by the end of 2006. All of the NPF’s assets 
and liabilities will be taken over by the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak 
Republic as of January 1, 2007.  
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Introduction 
In Czechoslovakia, decisions about the methods and procedures of economic 
transition were made in the first half of 1991, with the intent of pursuing a 
radical form of economic transformation. A rapid transition to a market 
economy was implicitly endorsed in the first free elections held in June 1990, 
appearing most concretely in the conceptual program entitled "Scenario of 
Economic Reform" that was approved by the federal parliament in September 
1990.  
From the beginning, promoters of rapid economic reform fully realised the 
daunting nature of swift and extensive privatisation, as well as the fact that it 
was absolutely essential to proceed with it. This led them to rely, in addition to 
well-known standard methods, on a non-standard procedure - the voucher 
scheme. As the voucher method of privatisation is rather complex, we do not go 
to details of it. This privatisation method is irrelevant for any kind of application 
for the Reform of the Defence System of the State Community of Serbia and 
Montenegro 
Underlying systemic changes consisted of establishing economic conditions and 
an economic environment that would automatically maximise interests, 
primarily economic interests and incentives, and induce such behaviour by 
macroeconomic entities that would promote efficiency and competitiveness both 
of individual businesses and the economy as a whole. In other words, this meant 
replacing the salesman’s market by the buyer’s one. Such a substantial change as 
the shift to demand-driven markets immediately caused much deeper thought 
about current reforms being implemented in Slovakia, as well as anticipated 
reforms. This revised reform process was launched in the late 1990s and will 
finish over the next several years by reforming the tax code, pensions, and the 
health system. Incomplete reforms will probably jeopardize a solid base for real 
growth.   
The centrally planned economy was riddled with deficiencies, with aggregate 
demand prevailing over aggregate supply. As a result, the problem was not of 
selling, but that of buying. At the same time, there existed no competitive 
environment, with imports being administratively limited and domestic 
producers facing virtually no competition. Manufacturers and salesmen did not 
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have to win buyers’ trust because in a deficient economy, they were able to sell 
everything anyway. Even if manufacturers and salesmen found themselves in 
trouble, they were not threatened with going out of business because the 
government would usually bail them out in the form of soft budgetary 
restraints, i.e., grants, subsidies, soft loans, or tax waivers.  
To achieve a successful transformation to a market economy, it was essential to 
impose a tight, criteria-driven economic environment, where a macroeconomic 
equilibrium could be reached through tight budgetary constraints, a uniform 
system of taxation, the minimisation of state grants and subsidies, and the 
liberalisation of foreign trade. All these measures were launched on 1 January 
1995 with the commencement of the economic reform. The reform was assumed 
to evolve in the following stages.  
The first stage, that of abrupt price increases, was projected to last 3 to 4 months.  
The second stage of adjustment was anticipated to produce economic decline as 
businesses adjusted to the new climate, and forecast to last one to one and a half 
years, followed by stage three, economic growth.  
The stage of abrupt price increases evolved almost entirely as predicted, lasting 
three to four months during which the rate of inflation went up by about 55 per 
cent. However, price increases then levelled out, and the annual inflation rate 
was only 63 per cent. As of April to May 1991, a tough, criteria-driven 
macroeconomic environment was imposed on the Czechoslovak economy.  
There is now a uniform taxation rate; subsidies and grants have been 
dramatically reduced compared to the early years of the transitional period; 
loans are only granted under commercial conditions, the sellers’ market has 
been replaced by a buyers’ market, and there is a macroeconomic equilibrium 
between aggregate demand and supply.  
The adjustment stage commenced roughly in July 1991. This stage, however, did 
not progress as quickly as initially projected. In other words, many enterprises, 
their altered economic environments notwithstanding, persisted in displaying 
patterns of behaviour inherited from the centrally planned communist economy. 
The most typical examples included over-producing huge inventories for 
warehouses without secured sales, relying on the government to sort out sales 
problems. Another example was the insufficient use of company assets, such as 
commercial utilisation of recreational facilities.  
A quick adjustment of individual businesses and the economy as a whole to 
market conditions is conditional on rapid changes in ownership. This applies 
both to individual firms and the economy as such. Inadequate or insufficiently 
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rapid adjustment of microeconomic units to changed conditions usually entails 
depreciation of enterprise property, among other consequences. Such long-
standing depreciation without an adequate response is easily possible under 
state ownership when there is no concrete owner who will have to assume the 
risks of failing to respond to the problems posed by asset depreciation. 
Privatisation, understood as a process seeking to achieve a dominant share of 
the economy by the private sector, is an immensely necessary but insufficient 
condition for a rapid and successful adjustment and economic restructuring, and 
thereby the overall success of economic transition.   
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The National Property Fund and the Macroeconomic 
Framework of the Process of Restructuring of the 
Slovak Economy 
The privatisation process in Slovakia was divided into two different 
frameworks: small-scale and large-scale. In the small-scale framework, the only 
privatisation method employed consisted of auctions where only those assets 
without entitlements and obligations were sold. These assets were primarily 
retail outlets, restaurants, smaller operations and factories, small hotels, etc. 
There was a restraint on foreign participation:  only domestic natural persons 
and legal entities were eligible to bid in the first round.  Foreign bidders were 
allowed to participate in a second round only when a business failed to be sold 
in the first one.  Small-scale privatisation was supervised at the regional and 
district level by District Privatisation Commissions accountable to the 
Privatisation Ministry.  
Because the pace and scope of privatisation were deemed to be important 
criteria, and given a lack of available funding as well as the generally long time 
needed for privatisation, a decision was taken to rely on, in addition to standard 
methods, a voucher scheme as a non-standard method.  
Large-scale privatisation was divided into two waves, during which the 
intention was to privatise most of the assets that could be privatised.  A decision 
was also taken to make the voucher scheme a component of each of the two 
privatisation waves (though the voucher scheme is not a subject of this paper). 
Parliament, acting on a governmental initiative, set up a specialised institution 
to handle privatization of large-scale state enterprises, namely the National 
Property Fund (NPF).  This NPF was and still is a distinct legal entity whose 
main role was and is to implement approved privatisation projects, conclude 
sale and purchase contracts in line with such projects, organise public tenders 
and auctions and temporarily administer government stakes (in formal terms, 
those were NPF stakes) in corporatised or partially privatised business 
companies. There were three National Property Funds, one at the federal level 
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and two in the constituent republics (the Czech Republic and Slovakia). A 
Presidium and Supervisory Board were the supreme bodies of these NPFs, their 
members being elected by respective parliaments by secret vote.  
Interests that Influenced the Process of Privatisation 
Even with socio-economic developments monitored by relevant statistical and 
informational services, for the time being it is impossible to draw a complete 
picture of all participants and their specific interests and attitudes involved in 
the privatisation process in Slovak society. However, it is quite possible to 
describe interests which existed before the privatisation process began. These 
interests changed to some degree over time, as the positions of particular groups 
towards privatised property evolved throughout the shaping of the privatisation 
process.  
One can understand that we are describing legal groups and people as well as 
some set of semi-legal and even illegal groups of people.  Of course, such groups 
try to play a role in the transition and privatization process everywhere in the 
world. Our meaning of the expression “interest group” refers to all privatisation 
process stakeholders, starting with managers of state-owned companies, and 
including groups of individuals trying to privatise the company under the best 
possible conditions for narrower group or individual interests that deviate from 
the interest of the state as represented by the NPF. All these groups use a range 
of available tactics (lobbying, blackmail, and biased media communication) to 
influence every privatisation transaction. A part of the privatisation process 
includes the hidden fight against each others’ interests, a subterranean 
competition and conflict of interests which, strikingly enough, promoted the 
values of efficiency and net economic benefit to the state as a trustee for the 
general public in the case of Slovakia.  
Factors in Privatisation 
Various groups within Slovak society differed from one another with regard to 
property, methods, and consequences (e.g., the fate of pension funds) of 
privatisation.  Not all citizens were or are equally interested in the privatisation 
process, which is why they did not show the same interest in obtaining 
privatisation-related ownership rights, though there was no official and/or 
formal reason why some groups of citizens should be excluded from 
privatisation. Practice has also shown that the intensity of privatisation-driven 
interests and activities of different groups varies significantly. 
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The differences in interests and activities of actors result from the following 
factors:  
1. The natural form of the property privatized in direct relation to the 
information costs, know-how, and network support needed to exploit that type 
of property: certain types of property can be used effectively only if an owner 
possesses some combination of certain skills, expert knowledge, experience, 
business contacts with suppliers and customers, etc. Of course, not every citizen 
is able to meet such criteria. Nor could everyone become a manager in a limited 
number of enterprises. 
2. Different degrees of real power and control of assets delineated for 
privatisation: in practice, certain groups (managers or officials) manipulating 
state property had various kinds of control over assets before privatisation was 
formally launched. Such control originated in the authorization those people 
were given to administer economic, managerial and production activities in 
state-owned enterprises, central state administrative bodies or the political 
institutions on which the whole state system was based. 
3. Assets available before privatisation and opportunities to acquire necessary 
capital through loans, joint ventures, or other approaches:  the acquisition of 
such assets and capital at the outset of privatisation was obviously not evenly 
distributed through the entire citizenry. 
4. Political decisions about the mode and conditions of the privatisation process. 
Those decisions significantly influenced citizens’ self-evaluation, along with the 
conditions described in paragraphs 1-3 above. Evidently, these antecedent 
political decisions shaped the effective execution of managerial and ownership 
rights and the distribution of real power in the society, and thus played a crucial 
role in citizens’ decision-making and in forming their attitudes towards 
privatisation. 
Based on the above four factors, an active interest in privatised property could 
be expected from those who either had at least the minimum cash necessary, or 
were able to get the cash through loans or joint ventures with foreign or 
domestic entities. Primarily this meant executive managers of state-owned 
companies, members of top management, employees together with managers, or 
owners of already privatised firms who could meet those conditions at the 
appropriate time. In addition only a very few individuals, either holding 
important positions in central state administrative bodies, or having strong 
political ties, could join the narrow group of potential privatisation participants. 
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Taking into account the situation of the Slovak cash deposits market and the so-
called “pre-privatisation positions,” which were based on real control of 
administered state-owned enterprises, it was no surprise that groups, rather 
than individual bidders, were able to succeed in privatisation. Those interest 
groups fought each other, as demonstrated by numerous scandals and 
controversies published in the press almost daily. Media accounts, however, do 
not allow us to determine the structure of the interest groups more precisely, to 
the extent that important actors remained behind the scenes. 
Here we can only speculate on possible combinations. Fights between old 
communists and new management interest groups have been frequently 
mentioned. This simplistic dichotomy of interest group competition is not at all 
exhaustive.  Participants in the privatisation process represent a wide range of 
individuals who differ from each other in political background and professional 
career history. Managers in old state-owned enterprises came from different 
professional environments. The break-down of huge state organizations and 
conglomerates resulted in a significant migration of managers. Officials from 
former general headquarters, managers in particular enterprises, and some 
employees from smaller operational units and distribution outlets all knew the 
real value of privatised property and all had approximately the same potential 
to meet the formal privatisation criteria. 
Moreover, managerial and other interest groups broadened their networks on 
the basis of family ties, as well as through local and regional contacts among 
network members. All groups were trying to build solid political support 
through alliances with various political parties. However, their interests did not 
have common ideological (or any other) grounds. In all cases, it was a marriage 
of convenience, or in other words a temporary alliance based on expected 
support in asserting managerial rights and ownership rights related to 
privatisation, and to help resolve resulting problems with the help of political 
patrons. 
Regardless of the real buyers’ economic interests that were shaping the 
privatisation process, official privatisation decisions usually stressed productive 
development of privatised enterprises as the top priority. 
The same was true in all cases when a sufficiently strong "pre-privatisation 
position" combined with a real economic interest in the development of the 
enterprise in question. On the other hand, there is a long list of recorded 
transactions where new owners of privatized companies did have just one 
simple interest: to sell their influence to third party investors eager and ready to 
run the business.  These “transient owners” had no interest to run the business 
in many cases:  their real interest was just to re-sell the company quickly for a 
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large profit.  That is why wealthy foreign investors were and are often 
welcomed. 
 
The ESOP Approach 
Proposals dealing with the new structure of ownership relations differed from 
each other significantly, especially in the early stages of transformation. They 
were based on voucher schemes where the vouchers were distributed to all 
citizens (older 18 years) and on direct sales methods. Sporadically, other 
proposals were introduced: ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plans, or ESOP), 
privatisation through the establishment of cooperatives, preferential rights for 
employees in the privatisation of the relevant facility, the regular sale of shares, 
and other modifications. Some proposals connecting the interests of employees, 
employers, and owners in Slovakia were inspired by ESOP plans implemented 
in the USA and other countries. 
The object of the ESOP alternative (which has sizeable support in Slovakia) was 
to overcome certain limitations stemming from collective ownership, and to 
make it possible for individual representatives of employees to own part of their 
particular enterprise. The solution depended on creating special shares through 
which both capital expansion and rapid workforce development could allegedly 
be reached at the same time. However, the authors of such proposals in Slovakia 
overestimated the strength and intensity of the employees’ interests. Such 
interests could have been successfully enforced in practice only with sufficient 
organizational strength of employee groups. Had a sufficient employee interest 
existed, even in latent form, it would have been possible to form strong 
collective interest groups of employees. That, however, did not happen. 
In enterprises with employee ownership participation, respective employees 
either put coupons into that enterprise, or bought its shares. Both alternatives 
resulted from (and were only a supplement to) the activities of management, 
which frequently had obtained decisive stakes in advance.7 Employee interest in 
ownership was strong, especially in regions where privatised facilities 
represented the only job opportunities or where employees felt that their job 
status was being threatened. Such activities were similar to pre-war movements 
enforcing the establishment of cooperatives or other societies supportive of 
employees.  
For the most part, employee interests were strictly individual in nature. No 
wonder that such individual interest, when competing with the interests of 
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potential external bidders, has proven to be insufficient and weak. The basic 
reason was that representatives of employees were not always sophisticated 
enough to compete with outside groups, who in many cases misused those 
employee representatives to play a hidden role on behalf of other investors.  
Employee ownership of shares did not secure employee jobs. One way or the 
other, selling the shares was often the only alternative offered to the employees, 
and it is hard to say whether their choice would be the same if they had another 
alternative available. Such ownership and employee-employer relations might 
be consistent with the development needs of the respective enterprise, but 
definitely does not create the strong collective entrepreneurial awareness that is 
the basis of all ESOP models. 
The interests of pensioners, medical beneficiaries, and other groups of the 
population are much like those expressed by employees. If not organized, such 
groups, though numerically large, tend to be relatively marginal actors whose 
interests are relevant only when some more powerful group needs them in order 
to satisfy its own ambitions. That explains why legal amendments proposing 
that part of pension funds should be covered by privatised property, or more 
precisely, by money gained from privatisation, were not introduced into 
Slovakia’s legislation, although such amendments were prepared in Slovakia, 
the Czech Republic, and other countries.  
Besides the aforementioned groups, political parties played and still play a 
crucial role in the privatisation process, since their representatives hold 
important positions in government bodies and take part in privatisation 
decision-making. 
Last but not least, foreign bidders also shape the process by their close 
relationship with some government representatives.  
Those are the groups whose interests are at play in privatization, or act on behalf 
of some other group which does not directly participate in privatisation.  
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The Process of Privatisation and Conflict of Interests 
The restructuring process had decisive impact on the management of state-
owned enterprises. 
The means for restructuring enterprises not destined for privatisation include 
legal restructuring (providing enterprises with a new juridical identity and 
access to credit and foreign exchange), commercialization (cutting off subsidies 
but allowing public enterprises to act as private commercial enterprises in 
pricing and capital-raising activities), and rehabilitation (giving public 
enterprises new loans for equipment and debt restructuring, as well as engaging 
in debt-equity conversion).  
Here, we are interested in the other means of restructuring: the privatisation 
process.  As part of privatisation, different interest groups substantially 
influenced the management of enterprises at the top level in Slovakia. This 
privatisation process, especially at the top level of management, reveals the 
socioeconomic and ethical problems linked with the emergence of new owners 
of enterprises and consequently new managers. 
The goal of the privatisation process in Slovakia is the transformation of state 
property into private property with different private owners. This process 
concerns also the problems of restructuring the economy in Slovakia. Authors 
distinguish two different types of restructuring through privatisation: a reactive, 
passive-type struggle for survival under the pressure of strict budgetary 
limitations, versus an active type of restructuring by seeking major changes and 
active adaptation.  The first type is characteristic mostly of enterprises 
dominated by insiders, managers and employees.  The second type is associated 
with foreign ownership of former state enterprises. All these entrepreneurs 
bring new capital and managerial know-how, and consequently have 
preconditions for active restructuring linked with new investments and a new 
managerial approach. This type also seeks new approaches to property, control 
in privatised enterprises, and management. 
The results of the privatisation process in the transfer of state property to foreign 
owners and the share of foreign investment and capital in such types of 
companies and enterprises in Slovakia are the following:  in September 1996, the 
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volume of foreign investment capital in the Slovak Republic was 845 million 
USD (equivalent at the time to 25,3 billion Slovak Crowns). 
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The Privatisation Process in Slovakia  
The results of the privatisation process in Slovakia former Czechoslovakia are 
found in the following figures, which show the percentage of privatised 
property: 
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
% 17,5 20,0 25,8 30,8 38,6 44,6 60,2 
 The privatisation process has proceeded very quickly since 1995.  Consequently, 
as a general matter, we can say that privatised and private enterprises are 
dominant in the Slovak economy, with the exception of banking and some 
infrastructural sectors. For instance, in Slovakia there are 48,520 profit-oriented 
organizations and of these, only 1,558 or 3.2 percent belong to the public sector, 
while 46,962 or 96.8 percent belong to the private sector. The situation in large 
enterprises is similar, such that the ratio between the public and private sector 
favoured the private sector by 143 to 174 in 1997; in middle-sized enterprises, the 
ratio was 1,540 to 395;  and in small enterprises the ratio was 3,152 to 308 in the 
same year. These large enterprises have very strong and influential lobbying 
groups working to ensure they receive good credit from banks or other financial 
institutions. 
A special characteristic of the situation in Slovakia is the formation of a class of 
new economic owners of big enterprises after the first and second wave of 
privatisation, and the new economic lobby connected with its interests. These 
new owners strongly influence the strategy of enterprises, not only at the level of 
top management of subsidiary enterprises and factories, but also as members of 
interest groups embedded on management boards of newly privatized 
companies, who shape much of the real decision-making process in Slovakia.  
Outside the respective firms, some of the newly founded large privatised 
enterprises have their own influential contacts in strategic posts in government. 
Consequently, if broad state policy on privatisation is dominated by the 
influence of lobbying groups that bridge the state and particular enterprises, it 
may not reflect the real economic interests of many other enterprises. 
In Slovakia, there is a real danger of too few lobbying groups that collude, 
possibly to the point of domination of policy decision-making by powerful 
lobbying groups of some of the most important Slovak enterprises. This 
corporatist situation may also influence interventionist fiscal policy on a broad 
scale, and consequently the decision-making process at all levels of government. 
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It may influence also the management in different kinds of enterprises, which in 
this sense is not dictated by pure economic reasons such as profit maximization 
and the promotion of real market, but by different political reasons. 
If we compare this type of management with the type of management in OECD 
countries, we can see the difference. Corporatism in post-communist countries 
raises the possibility that particular large enterprises, recognized or licensed by 
the state, are thus privileged and granted a deliberate monopoly within their 
respective categories in exchange for careful selection of enterprise leaders, 
distribution of political support to ruling parties, and perhaps moderation of 
some social demands. Corporatism also often involves a production and 
distribution system intended in part to benefit family and friendship 
connections, with less attention to the interests of the state (i.e., taxpayers). 
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Corruption Risks in Privatisation 
For analytical purposes, corruption – whether viewed from moral, ethical, or 
legal standpoints – originates in large part as a set of legal, social, and economic 
legacies bequeathed by the communist period to popular mentalities and values 
across a broad swath of post-communist society.  The illegal or immoral transfer 
of public resources to private use was endemic not just for communist-era elites, 
but also ordinary employees in state enterprises and other average citizens.  
Such widespread transfer was both rational and logical at a systemic level for 
individuals and families grappling with pressures on daily economic and 
political survival as well as for those seeking upward social mobility.  Values 
and attitudes towards commonly tolerated, informal practices of 
commandeering publicly-owned assets for private ends directly shape post-
communist behaviour for elites and ordinary citizens, and cannot be erased so 
easily. 
For Slovakia and its neighbours undergoing post-communist transformations, 
privatisation in particular offers a tempting environment in which to exercise 
old habits.  Legislation from the communist era is often understandably silent on 
the rules of private investment and asset transfer, while new rules on taxation 
and attempts to monitor income and declarations of assets have struggled to 
catch up to a privatisation process already well underway.  Though officially 
egalitarian, communist societies contained a significant minority of people with 
business experience and information, illicit or otherwise, who operated in the 
grey and black economies or in state enterprises, and who were thus better 
positioned than others to locate and acquire publicly-owned assets before their 
fellow citizens.  And popular frustration among Slovaks, as captured in opinion 
polls, has grown with the consistent failure of political and administrative 
authorities to punish and redress what ordinary citizens see as the unfair and 
immoral redistribution of public wealth for private gains for a narrow layer of 
citizens. 
That said, this analysis will briefly survey a few of the larger opportunities for 
corruption in the privatisation process. 
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 Types of Corruption:  Pre-privatisation Corruption 
(Spontaneous Privatisation) 
Spontaneous privatisation is a term that describes the securing and distribution 
of assets in the period between the start of economic transition or economic 
liberalisation, and the completion of the privatisation of a given enterprise. 
Primarily, this refers to asset acquisition and disposal pursued by the 
management of state-owned enterprises (or parts or individuals thereof) and 
people close to them.  
The scope and intensity of spontaneous privatisation is directly proportional to 
the length of the time that elapses between the start of economic transition 
(liberalisation) and completion of the privatisation of a given enterprise: the 
slower overall privatisation is, the more extensive spontaneous privatisation 
tends to be.  
It should be emphasised that spontaneous privatisation is observed to some 
degree in all economies in transition. 
The prolonged nature of the privatisation process was aggravated by the degree 
of dominance of state ownership and great confusion and lack of transparency 
in cadastre records. To ensure that emerging private property is not 
compromised, it is essential that only state-owned assets be privatised. At the 
same time, the privatisation process should be used to increase the measure of 
ownership transparency. Therefore, a clause with a full and clear description of 
how the state has acquired the property should be a feature of each base 
privatisation project, as well as proof of the fact that the state has been entrusted 
with the property for management purposes. Such evidence should be clear and 
available for every land allotment and other real estate.  
Restitution to pre-communist property owners was another reason for 
privatisation being time-consuming. Public opinion and governmental 
authorities deemed it essential to rectify past injustices and return nationalised 
or otherwise expropriated assets to their original owners or their heirs.  As 
stipulated by restitution laws, a certain period should be set aside for filing and 
proving restitution claims.  
A lack of political consensus concerning the methods and concepts of 
privatisation is another frequent reason for procrastination. This lack of 
consensus is often aggravated by the strong pressures of interest groups, 
political, professional and other forces.  
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Soon after the November 1989 political transition in Czechoslovakia, pro-reform 
political forces realised the need for rapid privatisation, namely because they 
viewed privatisation as an essential prerequisite of successful transition. 
However, state authorities expressed the intention to avoid spontaneous 
privatisation if possible.  
Section 45 of the Large-scale Privatisation Act (No. 92/1991) illustrated concern 
regarding spontaneous privatisation. This paragraph was designed to prevent 
the management of state-owned enterprises, in the period leading up to 
enterprise privatisation, from engaging in transactions beyond the scope of 
routine management that would depreciate enterprise value and result in 
material gains for management. At the same time, it was essential to ensure that 
such constraints on asset management should be as brief as possible, because 
otherwise the risk was that managers would have their hands tied, unable to 
accomplish those changes in asset structures that were important and necessary 
for the enterprise.  
After June 1992, the pace of privatisation in Slovakia slowed down. Before June 
1992, the progress of privatisation in the Czech and Slovak Republics were 
roughly equal, such that by the end of 1992, approximately 30 per cent of overall 
property in each republic was privatised.  However, by the end of 1994, the 
Czech Republic had about 80 per cent of its property already privatised, and 
Slovakia had a mere 37 per cent. In Slovakia, the period after June 1992 offered 
enormous opportunities for blossoming spontaneous privatisation.  
This assumption is confirmed by 1994 data, according to which prosecutors 
carried out inquiries into 271 state-owned enterprises, checking on the legality of 
state asset transfers made under exemptions from § 45 of the Large-scale 
Privatisation Act.  Prosecutors found that 242 transfers had been made contrary 
to existing regulations.  
In essence, spontaneous privatisation can be viewed as unfair material gains for 
private natural persons and legal entities at the expense of the state (whether via 
state-owned enterprises or joint-stock companies). Such activities are mostly 
organised, promoted or facilitated by the management that runs state property 
and the material gains are either directly or indirectly for the benefit of the same 
persons.  
Spontaneous privatisation is multifaceted, with methods determined by human 
ingenuity stimulated by prospective selfish gains. 
The most common method of spontaneous privatisation is the existence of two 
entities – a state-owned enterprise or state-owned joint-stock company, on the 
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one hand, and on the other hand, a private individual or legal entity with whom 
the management of the former is somehow linked. The form of connection may 
differ, ranging from explicit involvement to quiet partnership or the 
participation of relatives and friends, or hidden action in return. Most 
frequently, management teams incorporate limited liability companies in which 
they act as quiet partners.  
A second, sometimes related, method of spontaneous privatisation is the 
deliberate deterioration of the economic position of an enterprise, depreciating 
its value with a subsequent purchase at a low price.  However, such instances 
are not as common as those that rely on unbalanced transactions between state-
owned and private entities as described above – in other words, transactions 
that deliberately fail to compensate fully a state enterprise while resulting in 
great benefits for a private company.  
It is more than evident that almost all forms of spontaneous privatisation are 
facilitated by the clash between two types of entities with two types of incentives 
and, in particular, two types of controls. These are private entities with the clear 
incentive of maximising performance and profit, and state-owned entities 
without genuine owners, but with their representatives or at least managers 
supervised by genuine (state) owners. Under spontaneous privatization, 
managers routinely subordinate their trusteeship of the state’s interest to their 
individual interest in private firms.  It is understandable that state-owned 
enterprises are the losers in this uneven battle, with state property being 
dissipated and depreciated. 
Another typical feature relating to spontaneous privatisation is the absence of 
competitive methods of selecting partners and concluding contracts, since the 
Public Procurements Act (No. 263/1993) only came into effect on 1 January 1994. 
However, this form of spontaneous privatisation is of secondary importance, the 
primary factors being the absence of private ownership, private supervision and 
private incentives for state enterprises.  
Post-privatisation Corruption  
Corrupt behaviour also appears in cases of defaulting on contracts concluded by 
buyers and the NPF. Most commonly, the problem is failure to pay the purchase 
price of privatised property. The highest incidence of such behaviour is 
observed in instalment schemes.  
This phenomenon has become rather common since 1993. However, defaulting 
contractual parties should be divided into two groups. The first would include 
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those who do not pay for "objective reasons;"  the other one comprises those who 
do not pay largely for speculative reasons.  
After 1992, a variety of influences resulted in deterioration of economic 
conditions for business activity. This was primarily caused by the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia and a slowdown of the transition process in Slovakia. Changes 
in economic conditions facing firms included: 
• shrinking markets, including new difficulties in selling to the Czech Republic 
after 1992;  
• decreasing domestic demand, primarily resulting from economic decline, i.e., 
decline in the consumption of households, government and lower fixed 
capital formation;  
• greater challenges after the implementation of new schemes of pension, 
sickness and social insurance;  
• the initial total absence of lending funds, followed by a growing supply of 
such funds, albeit at high rates of interest, and aggravated by the persistent 
shortage of medium- and long-term loans;  
• deteriorating insolvency. 
In other words, conditions had changed significantly compared to the 
assumptions of prospective buyers at the time when the latter were formulating 
privatisation projects and proposing payment terms. The conditions 
deteriorated to an unexpected extent.  Some new owners of privatised assets 
found themselves unable to make payments according to the schedules to which 
they had committed themselves in the contracts.  
The other group includes such owners of newly privatised assets who, although 
economically in a position to pay, do not, relying on loopholes in the contracts, 
the large backlog of work at commercial courts, or political lobbying to let them 
get away scot-free or to help modify the contracts to reduce prices or to waive 
payments. Attempts to distinguish between these two groups and get the NPF to 
apply a differentiated approach in terms of collecting due payments or 
terminating purchase contracts would establish a vast area for discretion in 
subjective decisions and, thus, corruption. Therefore, one should either clearly 
define objective, discerning criteria (which is extremely difficult) or treat all 
delinquent buyers uniformly, insisting on compliance or contract termination by 
a court. The problem is that since the prevailing approach has been too soft so 
far, new owners have been disposing of their assets for quite some time and, if 
threatened with contract termination, would be able to enter into such equity 
and financial transactions that would reduce the value of eventually recovered 
assets to a point below their pre-privatisation value.  
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The National Property Fund reported that at the end of February 1995, it had 
overdue accounts receivable totalling SK 1.2 billion with 141 delinquent buyers. 
It should be added that the numbers would have been much higher but in 1994 
the NPF had rescheduled many contracts, postponing payments.  
Instalment plans are always associated with the risks of post-privatisation 
corruption. The problem is that the new owners acquire property and the right 
to dispose of it before paying the full price. Real estate may be used as collateral 
pending the last payment; however, it is not possible to prevent, in the case of 
defaults or contract termination, some assets from being stripped from the 
enterprise and transferred to the buyer, to the detriment of the enterprise, i.e. the 
state or NPF.  
Since the Government Manifesto of Prime Minister Mečiar’s present Cabinet 
states that instalment plans will be the prevailing privatisation scheme, the risks 
are that this form of post-privatisation corruption will continue to blossom. The 
possibility exists, however, that another risk may also prove to be real.  
There are two alternatives of selling an enterprise in instalments. The first one 
has been used so far, i.e. over 1990-1994.  Under this scheme, ownership is 
transferred to the buyer on the day the contract is signed or the first payment 
made. Under the second scheme, de jure ownership will be transferred to the 
buyer only after the last payment. Essentially, this would be a leasing scheme 
and it appears that recently this has been the prevailing approach of the NPF to 
instalment plans. The argument in favor of this approach is that there is an 
advantage in the greater ability of the state to hinder asset stripping by 
defaulting buyers.  
This, however, is spurious argumentation. If we were to confine ourselves to a 
narrow understanding of ownership transfer coinciding with the last payment, 
arrangements would have to be made, pending the last payment, to prevent the 
buyer from disposing of the property in excess of routine management. 
However, this is out of the question because privatised enterprises are in need of 
restructuring, which cannot be delayed another 10-15 years pending the last 
payment. Therefore, leasing-like sale schemes amount to privatisation that is 
almost instantaneous as a de facto matter but postponed de jure, which by no 
means and in no way reduces the risk of post-privatisation corruption.  
In addition, this scheme has another negative feature. It transforms the buyers of 
property into long-term (10-15 years) hostages of the powers-that-be, because 
this is exactly the period for which the de jure transfer of ownership rights is 
delayed. In terms of corruption, the problem is that, in such an insecure situation 
and deprived of independence, the new "owners" will be indirectly motivated to 
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divest their enterprises of as many assets as possible to secure their gains should 
the privatisation decision be revised to the detriment of their interests. Thus, it 
can be stated that, instead of the announced reduction in corruption risks, this 
alternative of instalment plans would result in much greater corruption since it 
would serve as an indirect incentive for just that corruption.  
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Background on Privatisation and Interest Groups in 
Political Decision-making  
Given that the executive and legislative branches of government decide on the 
means, pace and scope of privatisation, it is only natural that privatisation-
related interests are largely mediated by political parties.  
Interestingly, although not surprisingly, there are political parties that go 
beyond mere advocacy and actually apply policy positions favouring equal 
opportunities in privatisation.  These are parties that attempt to achieve a higher 
share of private ownership and minimise public ownership, and are typically 
parties of the conservative and classical liberal type.  
On the other hand, parties of the socialist type are often willing to yield to the 
pressures of certain interest groups and accord to them a privileged position in 
privatisation.  These parties also advocate a larger scope of public ownership 
which should remain in government hands either permanently or on a long-
term basis, thus creating potential room for spontaneous privatisation.  
A third group is comprised by non-standard political parties, which not only do 
not believe that equal opportunities are important but, without any scruples, 
arrange for preferential schemes favouring individuals and affiliated groups in 
order to strengthen their economic and political power. This group is obviously 
represented by individuals trying to play a decision-making role only on the 
basis of non-transparent schemes and transactions. Many such groups cloak 
themselves behind support of “neo-liberal” economic policy, making it hard to 
distinguish them from true liberal parties that seek to maximize equality of 
opportunities in privatisation. 
By far the most influential interest group regarding privatisation is 
represented by the managers of those state-owned enterprises that have been 
earmarked for privatisation. In this respect, it does not matter whether the 
persons involved are the old communist cadre filling their managerial positions 
since before November 1989 or taking office thereafter (in Slovakia the former 
group still prevails). What is important is their enormous interest in having a 
favoured status privatising their enterprises as well as their real and ever-
growing influence.  
What is the nature of the influence wielded by the management of state-owned 
enterprises? First, thanks to the pre-November nomenklatura system, many of 
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these people have very good connections in those political parties that have 
emerged either as transformed ex-communists or relying on a substantial 
segment of their former grassroots, as well as good connections in the executive 
branch and, particularly, within sector-relevant ministries. Relatedly, but 
perhaps more importantly, the network influence wielded by managers has 
grown as a direct consequence of privatisation being slowed and delayed. The 
growth in influence is a result of ongoing spontaneous privatisation, providing 
some management teams with increasingly rich financial resources. The political 
clout of managers also grows as post-communist and populist parties gain 
ground in popular support, while liberal and conservative parties that favour 
market transition reform lose ground. 
 According to the mass media covering the number of persons under criminal 
investigation or serving prison sentences resulting from corruption charges, the 
situation is as follows. In the period from 1 January 1990 to 7 November 1994, 
prosecutors’ offices kept on their files 115 criminal procedures pertaining to 
privatisation irregularities. A total of 193 persons were prosecuted, out of which 
88 persons were charged in connection to 48 cases relating to auctions within the 
small-scale privatisation scheme.  
 Conclusions Regarding Corruption: 
• Corruption cannot be avoided in the privatisation process. However, the 
degree of corruption is primarily determined by the forms and methods of 
privatisation that are employed, the pace of privatisation, and the degree of 
respect for principle of equal opportunities for buyers in the privatisation 
process.  
• As a function of cultural, economic, and legal legacies from the communist 
era, post-communist countries are prone to high levels of corruption.  
• The pace of privatisation is crucial in reducing opportunities for corruption:  
the longer the transition period with a prevalence of the public sector lasts, 
the more booming spontaneous privatisation becomes.  
• The voucher scheme offers the least room for corruption, making it possible 
to shorten the transition period with a prevailing public sector, and thus 
limiting spontaneous privatisation.  
• Competitive methods, such as auctions and public tenders, diminish 
corruption risks. The problem remains that they are not sufficiently versatile. 
In particular, public tenders are challenging in terms of time, know-how, and 
the need to harmonise the privatisation efforts of the Government, ministries, 
the NPF, and consultancies.  
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• Direct sales are the riskiest in terms of corruption opportunities. The key 
question is whether a system exists that would transform direct sales into 
simplified tenders, with clear criteria verifiable ex post.  
• A slowdown in privatisation logically increases the likelihood and scope of 
corruption, not only due to blossoming spontaneous privatisation, but also 
because of the growing political and economic influence of the groups that 
try to ensure their preferential treatment in privatisation.  
• As the political influence of post-communist and non-standard parties 
grows, so do opportunities for privatisation corruption.  
• A homogeneous government or a government in which a single party has a 
dominant position runs a higher corruption risk.  
• Clear, unambiguous, equal and publicly known rules of the game and 
publication of privatisation-related information constitute the best security 
against privatisation corruption.  
• Lacking rules, unclear rules, objectively unverifiable criteria, withholding 
information constitute a conducive medium for privatisation corruption.  
• Mistrust of privatisation is also increased by the fact that, so far in Slovakia, 
only a few cases of corruption and extortion relating to small-scale 
privatisation auctions have been taken to court.  
• The most important factor that not only makes privatisation corruption 
tolerated but literally organised by the government (see the V. Mečiar 
Government Manifesto for the stated intention to give preferential treatment 
to management teams) is the almost total absence of pressure by public 
opinion. This is apparently related to the degree to which the public is prone 
to behave contrary to laws, morality and ethics but is also associated with the 
immature and underdeveloped nature of civic society in Slovakia. 
Recommendations to Minimise Corruption in 
Privatisation  
• Start privatisation as soon as possible after the collapse of the old system, 
and proceed as fast as possible, relying extensively on non-standard 
methods.  
• With regard to standard methods, large and important enterprises, if not 
privatised in the voucher scheme, should be sold by public tender, the 
organisation of which should, from the very beginning, be managed by 
eminently qualified international firms.  
• In privatisation as a large-scale process, more emphasis should be put on 
auctions, especially for small and medium enterprises and in instances where 
the sale price is the only criterion for maximization.  
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• Direct sales should be organised as simplified tenders (sealed bids) with clear 
criteria, rules and the possibility of ex post compliance verification; rules and 
criteria should be binding and publicly known; compliance verification 
should be enabled to all the interested parties, primarily to competing 
bidders, mass media, political parties, and other interest groups.  
• A new law should be passed ensuring privatisation control and, primarily, 
control over the National Property Fund, by all parliamentary parties; all 
political parties present in parliament should be able to delegate their 
nominees to the NPF Presidium and Supervisory Board.  
• The NPF should be prevented from growing into a new super-ministry, from 
being misused in attempts to preserve undue government influence in 
enterprises, or from primarily advancing the interests of political parties.  
• Ensure speedy privatisation of shares held by the NPF.  
• The Finance Ministry should be more exacting in playing its supervisory role 
over investment funds and investment companies, especially in the period 
between issued shares being transferred to such funds, and the establishment 
by shareholders of their corporate bodies. Particular attention should be paid 
to the funds and their founders where higher risks could be assumed of their 
improper behaviour given the commitments assumed during voucher 
registration or the zero round of the voucher scheme. 
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The National Property Fund in Slovakia from the 
Inside Out 
 
The most important role of any government, in the area of privatization, is to 
establish an institutional infrastructure capable of organizing the process of 
selling state-owned assets in the most transparent and effective way possible. 
This goal is very hard and politically sensitive to accomplish. 
 
It is always a sensitive matter to organize the process where various interest 
groups meet (politicians, managers, investors, and the general 
public/electorate). To make this process effective and transparent, the process 
needs to delineate as appropriate political responsibilities and managerial 
capabilities and professionalism in specific areas of activities. 
 
The highly sensitive difficulty is to devise methods to constrain the rent-seeking 
or micro-managing influence of politicians, while allowing the latter to exercise 
some measure of political oversight of transactions involving state assets. To 
ensure that this function is working properly, independent professionals have to 
be invited to run the day-to-day operations of the privatization entity. 
 
The Slovak story is about how to get this mission accomplished with a minimum 
of (nearly inevitable) privatization scandals or other political and social 
problems.  In terms of corporate governance solutions, the NPF’s most direct 
interface of political representatives with professional managers occurred 
through the Executive Board proper.  Also, interest group input could be 
communicated to managers through the transmission of political guidance from 
the Presidium to the Executive Board. 
 
 
The Fund of National Property of the Slovak Republic (“FNM SR”) was 
established on 28 June 1991 on the basis of Act No. 253/1991 (Digest) of the 
National Council of the Slovak Republic, concerning the jurisdiction of 
authorities of the Slovak Republic in matters of transfer of state property to other 
persons and on the Fund of National Property. 
  
 The principal task of the Fund of National Property (hereafter referred to as 
“the Fund”) is to realize privatisation projects, based on privatisation decisions. 
In cases involving direct sale of property or shares, the Fund organizes selection 
proceedings, and provides for preparation and procedure in public commercial 
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tenders. It also prepares and concludes sales contracts with the acquirers of 
privatised property. In privatisation cases realized by depositing state property 
in a joint stock company, the Fund acts as the founder and majority shareholder, 
selling shares of such companies to the individual acquirers. 
  
The property of the Fund consists of privatised property, assigned to it pursuant 
to Act No. 92/1991 (Digest) on the conditions of transfer of state property to 
other persons, as amended by later legislation (further referred to as “the Act”); 
of profit, resulting from participation of the Fund in the business of relevant 
commercial companies; of earnings, resulting from sales of stock or ownership 
interest in entities other than joint stock companies; of stock or ownership 
interest that had not been subject to a privatisation decision but acquired by the 
Fund as a stockholder or a partner; and of property transferred to the Fund 
consequently to termination of privatisation-related contracts. Revenues and 
expenses of the Fund are not included in the SR national budget and may only 
be used in compliance with the Act. 
  
 The Fund is under direct control of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, 
to which the Fund submits its budgets, proposals of use of its property, and 
activity reports. Also, the supreme official bodies of the Fund, i.e., the Presidium 
and Supervisory Board are elected and recalled by the National Council of the 
Slovak Republic. 
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The Role of the National Property Fund in the 
Privatisation Process  
 
Privatisation as a process of change in ownership rights in the economy has been 
underway in Slovakia since the beginning of the overall transition from the 
command economy of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, and toward a 
market economy that relies in part on the creation and independent operation of 
the National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic (hereafter referred to as the 
"Fund") as a vital institution of economic transformation. 
 
Upon privatisation decisions taken by the government, the Fund concludes 
contracts for the sale of an enterprise or a part of an enterprise, and/or 
establishes joint stock companies of the same date as it acquires a property from 
the State and earmarked for privatisation. Further usage of the Fund’s assets is 
regulated by governmental decision regarding the following methods of 
privatisation: establishing a joint stock company or other trading company, and 
handling property ownership shares in such companies; selling the property of 
an enterprise or a portion thereof through a public tender, public auction or by 
sale to a pre-set buyer; property transfer to municipalities; property transfer to 
the Slovak Land Fund in case of property serving to agricultural or forestry 
production; and, finally, settlement of some restitution claims. The Fund assets 
comprise, primarily, property ownership participation in trading companies, 
money means and receivables acquired from the privatised property sale. 
Moreover, profits flowing to the Fund from its engagement in doing business of 
trading companies also contribute to the Fund’s assets. In terms of legislation, 
the Fund assets are separate from other state assets, and ,must exclusively be 
used for the purposes stipulated by the Act. 
 
The Fund’s property is used for the purposes of privatisation or its promotion; 
for meeting liabilities of enterprises identified for privatisation; for 
strengthening the bank sources defined for credits; for meeting guarantees for 
the credits of trading companies where the Fund is engaged, in terms of 
ownership, with not less than 34%; for increasing the equity of trading 
companies where the Fund is a shareholder or a partner; for transfer of means 
into the municipalities’ assets, etc. The Fund’s resources are also used for Slovak 
development program support. The amount of financial resources used for the 
foregoing purposes is approved by the National Council of the Slovak Republic 
upon proposal by the Fund. 
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In terms of size of property, the privatization method of creating a joint stock 
company and the subsequent sale of shares pursuant to the privatisation 
decision is the method most often used in Slovakia. In the first stage of the 
privatisation process, the major part of shares is sold via coupon privatisation 
(by investment coupons / vouchers). Due to the changes in the government’s 
privatisation strategy, the coupon privatisation method has been changed to a 
bond method, and any investment coupon holder has been entitled to be 
financially compensated by Fund in the form of a bond issued by the Fund 
(hereinafter referred to as a "Fund bond"). 
 
If, when carrying out the above mentioned activities in the privatisation process, 
rights and liabilities accrue to the Fund; the Fund has the right, on one hand, to 
obtain court or other authoritative bodies’ enforcement of its rights; on the other 
hand, the Fund may be sued for not meeting its liabilities or other obligations. 
The Fund guarantees all of its liabilities by all of its assets. 
 
Official Bodies of the Fund 
 
The Presidium  
The Presidium is constituted of nine members. Its powers include appointment 
and revocation of Executive Board members, submission of proposals of the 
annual balance of accounts and annual reports on Fund activities in the 
preceding year for approval by the National Council of the Slovak Republic 
upon debate in the Government of the Slovak Republic, submission of draft 
Fund budgets and proposals for the use of Fund assets under § 28, para 3, indent 
b) for approval by the National Council of the Slovak Republic after debate in 
the Government of the Slovak Republic. 
The Presidium’s scope of activities includes: 
 
a) appointment and dismissal of Executive Board members; 
b) approval of the Rules of Procedure for the Presidium and Executive 
Board, and the Organizational Chart of the Fund; 
c) submission of the following to the relevant bodies for discussion and 
approval:  
? proposals on how to use Fund assets; 
? Fund Budget proposals; 
? annual financial statements for previous year; 
? By-laws drafts. 
 
Through amendment of the original Act, the Presidium has been given added 
competencies for approving direct sales which have become a dominant 
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privatisation method.  The Presidium issued decisions on direct sale 
privatisation to a pre-determined buyer. Consequently, after the Constitutional 
Court issued its findings in November 1996, the Presidium no longer has the 
right to issue decisions on direct sale privatisation, nor to change decisions 
issued.  The Constitutional Court findings do not apply to the Presidium’s 
decisions on sale of the property ownership participation of the Fund in trading 
companies, nor does it refer to the property acquired by the Fund as a result of 
contract withdrawal (Article 28, Parts 5 and 6 of the Act). 
 
The Presidium is composed of:  
 
? 1 President  
? 1 Vice-President  
? 7 Members  
 
The Supervisory Board 
The responsibilities of the Supervisory Board include control of the activities and 
of the economic management of the Fund, including its Presidium and Executive 
Board, from the viewpoint of compliance with the law, with other generally 
binding legal regulations, and with the by-laws of the Fund. Any identified 
inadequacies are communicated by the Supervisory Board to the Presidium, the 
Government, the National Council and/or other authorities. 
 
The Supervisory Board oversees the activities and management of the Fund, its 
Presidium and Executive Board. If any deficiencies are revealed, it provides 
warning, due to the nature of the matter, to the Presidium, Government, 
National Council and other competent authorities, if needed. It also assesses 
materials submitted to the Slovak Government, including budget drafts, annual 
financial statements and annual reports. 
 
The Supervisory Committee comprises 6 members who are voted for and 
dismissed by the National Council of the Slovak Republic by ballot upon 
proposal of its Committee. Vice-Chairman is voted for from and by the 
Supervisory Board members. Fund staff cannot become members of this body. 
 
In terms of conflict of interest, membership on more than one body among the 
Presidium, Executive Board, and Supervisory Board, is mutually incompatible, 
except for the position of the Presidium Vice-president.  No member of the 
Government, and/or MP can become a member of the Presidium, Executive 
Board, or Supervisory Board. 
 
Thus far, the composition of the Supervisory Board is as follows:  
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? 1 Chairman  
? 1 Vice-Chairman  
? 5 Members  
 
The Executive Board 
The Executive Board is the statutory body of the Fund that is responsible for the 
management of its activities. The function of its Chairman is executed by the 
Vice President of the Presidium. The remaining ten members, elected by the 
Presidium, are responsible for management of the individual Sections. All 
members are employees of the Fund. 
 
The Executive Board is a statutory body of the Fund ensuring the Fund’s 
operation pursuant to the Presidium’s instructions. Members are entitled to act 
on behalf of the Fund and are registered with the Commercial Register.  
 
The Executive Board acts on behalf of the Fund to the extent regulated by its by-
laws.  The validity of written legal actions requires the signatures of two 
members, one of them being Chairman or Vice-Chairman. 
 
The Executive Board consists of 11 members.  The Executive Board Chairman’s 
role is performed by Vice-President of the Presidium.  Other members are voted 
for by the Presidium and all of them are considered Fund employees. 
 
The Executive Board is composed of:  
 
? 1 Chairman  
? 2 Vice-Chairmen  
? 8 Members  
 
Members of Fund bodies and Fund employees cannot act in contradiction with 
the interests of the Fund. Members of the Presidium, Executive Board, or 
Supervisory Board cannot acquire Fund assets, apart from Fund bonds and 
shares for such bonds. Any member of the Presidium, Executive Board, or 
Supervisory Board may waive his or her function by written announcement to 
the body which appointed him or her to the position; the corresponding 
membership then ceases to exist on the day of delivery of written announcement 
on waiving the position. 
 
Members of the Executive Board are hired based on public recruitment tenders 
announced and organized by a governmental advisor. This advisor is hired 
based on the tender run under conditions of the Public Procurement Act of the 
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Slovak Republic. The advisor is a company with professional expertise in 
management recruitment or executive searches. All recommendations of the 
advisor given to government have to be confirmed by government on its official 
meeting. Refusal of the advisor’s recommendations is an act that has to be 
argued and publicly announced.  
 
The Executive Board of the NPF is where professional management capabilities 
interface with a small group of political representatives. This match is crucial for 
smooth operations of the NPF. It is also why an independent, professional 
management team is hired to help to mitigate potential influences which might 
lead to costly or damaging compromises affecting Board members’ 
professionalism.  
 
The Executive Board is empowered to call on the assistance of any professional 
entity regarding any privatization transaction in order to eliminate transactional 
risks the NPF faces. Thus, the Board calls out tenders for lawyers, advisors 
(evaluators), auditors, etc. All contracting partners have to be tendered under 
conditions of the Public Procurement Act. 
 
Formal control of these procedures is carried out by the National Control Office 
(an independent office whose chairman is elected by Parliament). 
 
 
Organizational Structure of the NPF 
The organizational structure of the Fund and its activities are governed by 
Statutes approved, after discussion with the Government, by Parliament. The 
Statutes also define the scope of mutual co-operation between the Fund, the 
Ministry of Finance, the founders and the Government, as related to the 
activities of the Fund, especially concerning the founding of companies under 
Privatization Awards, among other activities. The Statutes define also the mode 
of co-operation between the Fund and the Slovak Land Fund.  
 
Termination of the Activities of the Fund  
The mode of termination of the activities of the Fund, its liquidation, and the use 
of the balance remaining on its accounts will be determined by the National 
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Council of the Slovak Republic by a special Act. The termination of the NPF’s 
activities is expected by the end of 2005. 
Further enumeration of the strict laws and rules regarding the NPF’s property 
and its use can be found in Appendix B at the end of this document. 
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Lessons Learned 
 
 
1. It is vital to set the right mechanism to split political control, at the 
highest controlling level, and process control functions within the 
restructuring involved entity.  It is possible to keep the system politically 
independent while maintaining a high level of professionalism at the 
management level of operations. 
 
2. Any system operating in the area of restructuring state-owned assets 
(and beyond this field) has to be as transparent as possible.  Very exact 
rules (provided by political administration) have to be in place for a 
state agency involved in the area of high risk transactions. Without such 
written, publicized rules, the management is facing risk that will never 
meet expected level of transparency and even highly professional 
decisions would be undermined in the process of revision of those rules. 
 
3. The state agency’s administrative staff should be kept as small as 
possible in order to keep “the cost of transactions” low.  Management 
principles have to be very strict, and should allow the management of the 
entity to maintain a high level of professionalism while providing 
transparency for all major stakeholders. 
 
4. Management’s goals for the restructuring agency are not always identical 
to other stakeholders’ goals. The reason concerns the durability of the 
restructuring agency over time:  while it is in the state’s interest to sell 
assets as quickly as possible, the management of the entity is not 
necessarily motivated to close the agency down quickly, such that 
management, depending on its incentives, might prolong the agency’s 
operations as long as possible.  That is why the strict rules given to the 
management have to be exact and strict.  
 
5. The restructuring agency should be required to prepare a detailed 
financial plan for each fiscal year, and the plan needs to be discussed and 
approved on the state budgetary level (ministry of finance, parliament, 
etc) in a timely manner.  If such a plan is not approved, the level of 
effectiveness of the agency’s operations will be dramatically lower than 
is in case when the financial plan is in place. 
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6. All transactions with state assets have to be transparent and all 
operations of the entity have to be audited by an independent, reputable 
financial auditor.  Without such an independent audit, all operations 
will be hard to defend against any political, public or media opposition.  
 
 
7. It is very important to keep senior political actors involved in some 
controlling function over the entity’s operations. Only elected politicians 
have a mandate to control whether or not transactions involving state-
owned assets are being done properly, transparently, and effectively.  On 
the other hand, politicians must not have influence over any of the 
professional decisions on specific transactions that management must 
take.  The role of politicians is to control the entity mainly through 
financial and liquidity plans, consultations on crucial areas of 
operations with an independent auditor, and through parliamentary 
committee hearings involving the agency’s management. 
 
  
8. The list of hard elements (laws, regulations, progress measurement by the 
government) and soft elements (e.g., issues of corporate governance, 
declarations of commitments, etc.) of control mechanisms covers all 
relevant controlling elements for this kind of business. It is essential to 
insist on holding to all those parameters and not to apply a selective 
(arbitrary) approach in imposing those elements.  Any exception or 
controlling elements of selection will definitely lead all stakeholders to 
deadlock -- either being unable to execute any transaction effectively, or 
unable to ensure  transparency and  trust from the community of outside 
stakeholders. Both outcomes will lead to the collapse of the agency. 
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Appendix A 
 
Overall Sale Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage 1 
 
Preparation for Privatization 
(Review, and preliminary decision to 
privatise) 
 
 
 
 
 Stage 2 
 
Preparation for Sale 
(Assessment by NPF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Stage 3 
 
Pre-Qualification of Bidders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Stage 4 
 
Tender preparation and 
submission 
(For short-listed bidders) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Stage 5 
 
Evaluation of offers and award of 
contract 
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Appendix B 
 
Property of the NPF and Its Use 
1. The property of the Fund consists primarily of:  
a. property transferred under the ownership of the Fund  
b. proceeds from the participation of those companies in whose business 
the Fund itself participates;  
c. proceeds from the sales of shares and/or interests in other than joint-
stock companies; 
d. shares or property interest that were not subject to Privatisation 
Awards, and shares and property interests acquired by the Fund in its 
capacity as a shareholder or business partner;  
e. property, that has been transferred under the ownership of the Fund 
due to a withdrawal from a contract under Section 6.  
2. Financial resources comprising a part of revenues of a special account of the 
Ministry (special regulations 8c)) that become, after clearing under Section 4, 
property of the Fund.  
3. Revenues and expenses of the Fund do not comprise a part of the national 
budget of the Slovak Republic and may be used only for the following 
purposes:  
a. in accordance with the Privatisation Award:  
1. for privatisation purposes according to Paragraph 12, 
Section 2;  
2. for property transfers under the Restitution Investment 
Fund;  
3. for defrayal of expenses accrued by the acquirer due to 
settlement of environment-related liabilities arising prior 
to the privatisation of the enterprise, including those that 
were unknown to the acquirer before entering into the 
purchase agreement concerning the enterprise or a part 
thereof.  
b. in accordance with a resolution of the Government;  
c. to discharge the obligations or liabilities of enterprises designated for 
privatisation, mainly liabilities related to credits collateralized by a 
lien;  
d. to strengthen the resources of credit institutions;  
e. to meet the obligations due to credit guarantees granted to companies 
with at least 34% permanent capital participation of the Fund;  
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f. to support development programmes of the Slovak Republic up to a 
level approved according to Paragraph 33, Section 3;  
g. to increase the equity capital of companies of which the Fund is a 
shareholder or partner;  
h. to cover the expenses related to the operation of the Fund, up to a 
level determined by the Fund’s budget; 
i. to provide financial compensation to subjects that the Fund was liable 
to for damages, if such liability was not taken over by the acquirer of 
the privatised property; 
j. to cover the expenses related to the support, provided to the 
privatisation process;  
k. for purchase of property, or property interest to which the Funds 
holds pre-emptive rights; 
l. to meet the claims of persons qualifying under special regulations  to 
cover those court expenses of privatisation and restitution-related 
judicial lawsuits that are to be covered by the Ministry and/or the 
Fund, or to cover the expenses related to indemnification for damages 
caused by the Ministry and/or the Fund;  
m. to be credited to a special account of the ministry for uses under 
special regulation;  
n. to transfer funds under the ownership of municipalities to an extent 
amounting to 25% of the total share from the net proceeds from the 
sales of those operating units under special provisions and which fell 
under the competence of municipalities and local bodies of state 
administration in individual districts of the Slovak Republic; after 
December 1, 1992, these resources will be distributed among 
individual municipalities of a given district according to the size of 
their populations; 
o. to defray the outstanding environment-related debts owed to the State 
by bankrupt firms fully owned by the Fund; 
p. for other purposes, if so required by special Acts; 
q. to cover the expenses related to the issue and repayment of bonds 
issued by the Fund, including their yields;  
r. to cover the expenses arising due to withdrawals from contracts 
and/or to leasing of property acquired in that way;  
s. to deal with the property interests of the Fund that the Fund acquired 
in accordance with Section 1.  
4. The Ministry and the Fund undertake regular annual clearing of the 
revenues under Section 2 and expenses under Section 3, of the Fund that 
must be finalized by the end of the February of the following year.  
5. The property of the Fund and its interests in enterprises owned by other legal 
persons that were not privatizable under Privatisation Awards will be dealt 
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with by the Fund in a manner decided by the Presidium upon a proposal of 
the Executive Board.  
6. The same procedure as in Section 5 will be used to deal with that property of 
the Fund and its interests in enterprises, formerly owned by other persons, 
which the Fund acquired as a consequence of withdrawals from agreements 
due to violations of contract conditions by the acquirers of the privatised 
property.  
Legal Acts Concluded by the Fund  
1. Based on the Privatisation Award, the Fund concludes on its own behalf 
contracts, agreements, and other legal acts, such as:  
a. founding of companies and/or taking part in their founding  
b. acquisition of shares due to its participation in the business 
activities of stock companies and execution of other shareholder’s 
right; 
c. execution of partner’s rights due to its participation in other 
companies that are not stock companies;  
d. sharing of the economic results (i.e., profits and losses) of 
companies’ business activities in which the Fund takes part; 
e. sales of shares and/or interests of other companies that are not 
stock companies; 
f. acquiring of shares from the residual value of a company after its 
liquidation to the extent proportional to the Fund’s participation in 
that company in the case of liquidation settlement; 
g. conclusion of sale contracts regarding enterprises or parts thereof 
and doing so, the Fund may act through tenders; 
h. sales of the privatised property through public auctions; 
i. transfer of privatised property under the ownership of 
municipalities and the Slovak Land Fund; 
j. transfer of privatised property for the purpose of health insurance, 
sickness insurance and retirement insurance and for other 
purposes within the active employment policy financed by the 
Employment Fund of the Slovak Republic;  
k. lease of property for fixed time until its privatisation.  
2. Prior to founding of a company under a Privatisation Award, the Fund 
carries out an update of the value of its non-cash contribution. If such 
update results in a requirement to found a company with a value of 
equity capital and/or reserve fund differing from that stated in the 
Privatisation Award, the Fund may do so only with prior approval by the 
Ministry.  
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3. If the update of the value of a non-cash contribution as of the effective 
day of the founding of a company has been carried out by the Fund after 
the founding of that company, and the general assembly of the 
shareholders decides to increase the value of equity capital of that 
company before April 5, 1995, the effect of that increase of the equity 
capital takes place on the date of such decision. Such increases of the 
value of the equity capital are not affected by the provisions of Paragraph 
181 Section 2, and Paragraph 202 Section 4 of the Company Code.  
4. Government guarantees granted for credits provided under special 
provisions before January 1, 1995 are taken over by the Fund in the case 
the Fund’s participation in companies’ permanent capital reaches a level 
of at least 34% on the effective date of this Act.  
5. The Fund may found companies by either cash or non-cash contributions.  
6. Legal acts concluded by the Fund under Section 1, require the co-
operation with the founders of the enterprises.  
7. The Fund will also settle the claims of qualifying persons in cases when 
the deprivation of the property happened in a way specified in Paragraph 
2, Section 3 of the Act No. 87/1191 Corpus Iuris On Extrajudicial 
Rehabilitation, and the Fund will have to do so within a schedule 
specified in the particular Privatisation Award, but not later than within 
one year from the date of issue of the Privatisation Award. The Fund will 
settle such claims only in the case of their timely filing by the qualifying 
persons who must also give the name and location of the enterprise 
holding those claims.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The National Property Fund and Privatization in Slovakia                                                           44  
 
 
Stevana Sremca 4 • 11 000 Belgrade • Serbia
t +381 11 303 3456 • f +381 11 334 5350
1514 N. Longfellow Street • Arlington, Va 22205 • US
t +1 571 594-2863
info@jeffersoninst.org 
The Jefferson Institute is an independent trans-
Atlantic research and education institute. We 
are inspired by Thomas Jefferson’s challenge to 
pursue truth, wherever it may lead, and his vision 
of foreign policy at its best: to prevail through 
ideas and commerce.
Our mission is simple: informing decision with 
alternative solutions. We produce and deliver 
focused original foreign policy analysis from field-
based analytical teams. We build capacity for 
applied research in the communities where we 
work.
